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Abstract
In this article we consider a game theoretic approach to the Risk-Sensitive Benchmarked Asset Manage-
ment problem (RSBAM) of Davis and Lleo [6]. In particular, we consider a stochastic differential game
between two players, namely, the investor who has a power utility while the second player represents the
market which tries to minimize the expected payoff of the investor. The market does this by modulating
a stochastic benchmark that the investor needs to outperform. We obtain an explicit expression for the
optimal pair of strategies as for both the players.
Key Words: Risk- Sensitive control , zero sum stochastic differential game.
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1 Introduction
In this article we shall develop a game theoretic version of a continuous time optimization model
with risk-sensitive control approach more specifically termed as Risk-sensitive control portfolio optimization
(RSCPO). The RSCPO balances an investor’s interest in maximizing the expected growth rate of wealth
against his aversion to risk due to deviations of the realized rate from the expectation. The subjective notion
of investor’s risk aversion is parameterized by a single variable, say θ. More formally, we write the finite
horizon risk-sensitive optimization criterion as : Maximize,
JT,h := −
1
θ
logE[e−θF (T,h)]
where F (T, h) is the time-T value reward function corresponding to control h. In the optimal investment
problem we take F (T, h) = logV (T ) where V (t) is the time t-value of the portfolio corresponding to portfolio
asset allocation h. An asymptotic expansion around θ = 0 for the above criterion yields
JT,h = E[F (T, h)]−
θ
2
V ar(F (T, h)) +O(θ2)
From this expression it is clear this criterion compromises between maximizing the portfolio return while
penalizing the riskiness . The optimal expected utility function depends on θ and is a generalization of
the traditional stochastic control approach to utility optimization in the sense that now the degree of risk
aversion of the investor is explicitly parameterized through θ rather than importing it in the problem via
an exogenous utility function. Values of θ > 0 correspond to a risk-averse investor, θ < 0 to a risk-seeking
investor and θ = 0 to a risk-neutral investor who maximizes
JT,h := E[F (T, h)]
There has been a substantial amount of research on the infinite-time horizon ergodic problem:
max J¯∞ where
J¯∞ = lim inf
t→∞
−
1
θ
t−1 logE[e−θF (t,h)]
Though these type of problems are interesting in their own right, they are not readily applicable to practical
asset management because of non-uniqueness of optimal controls.
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In the past decade, applications of risk-sensitive control to asset management have proliferated. Risk-
sensitive control was first applied to solve financial problems by Lefebvre and Montulet [12] in a corporate
finance context. Fleming [8] was the first to show that some investment optimization models could be re-
formulated as risk-sensitive control problems. Bielecki and Pliska [2] considered a model with n securities
and m economic factors with no transaction cost. They were the first to apply continuous-time risk-sensitive
control as a practical tool that could be used to solve “real-world” portfolio selection problems. They con-
sidered a long-term asset allocation problem and proposed the logarithm of the investor’s wealth as a reward
function, so that the investor’s objective is to maximize the risk-sensitive (log) return of his/her portfolio.
They derived the optimal control and solved the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDE under the
restrictive assumption that the securities and economic factors have independent noise. In [3], Bielecki and
Pliska went on to study the economic properties of the risk-sensitive asset management criterion and then
extended the asset management model into an intertemporal CAPM in [4]. Fleming and Sheu [7] analyzed an
investment model similar to that of Bielecki and Pliska [2]. In their model, however, the factor process and
the security price process were assumed correlated. A major contribution was made by Kuroda and Nagai
[11] who introduced an elegant solution method based on a change of measure argument which transforms the
risk sensitive control problem into a linear exponential of a quadratic regulator. They solved the associated
HJB PDE over a finite time horizon and then studied the properties of the ergodic HJB PDE related to J¯∞.
Recently, Davis and Lleo [6] applied this change of measure technique to solve, for both the finite and an
infinite horizon, a risk-sensitive benchmark investment problem (RSBAM) in which an investor selects an
asset allocation to outperform a given financial benchmark. In the Kuroda and Nagai set-up θ represents the
sensitivity of an investor to total risk, whereas in the RSBAM, θ represents the investors sensitivity to active
risk i.e. additional risk the investor is willing to take in order to outperform the benchmark. It is obvious
that for outperforming a stochastic benchmark, an investor will have to modify his or her optimal trading
strategy. Then the question of interest to us is: “What is the investor’s worst case strategy for an opposing
stochastic benchmark”?. In particular, one can even take the jaundiced point of view that the benchmark
will be set retrospective to the worst case. For example, if a portfolio fund manager outperforms the set
benchmark, the principal may remark this out-performance either as best achieved or poorly achieved with
respect to the underlying worst-case scenario. So, in this article we consider a game-theoretic version of the
problem within the benchmark framework of Davis and Lleo [6]. In it, we consider a stochastic differential
game between two players, namely, the investor (who has a power utility) and a second player, representing
the market, who tries to minimize the expected payoff of the investor. We explicitly characterize the optimal
allocation of assets and the optimal choice of benchmark index.
In this article, we consider the benchmark process ex-ante that evolves according to a controlled
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diffusion process. We contrast this approach to the one of Heath and Platen [10]. In their methodology,
they use the growth optimal portfolio itself as a benchmark which is closer to the concept of the numeraire
portfolio. Although there has been a long history of applying risk-sensitive optimal control to problems in
finance, a game-theoretic version of such problems in finite horizon is missing from the literature. We intend
to elaborate further on this now.
In the next section we briefly describe the framework of the risk-sensitive zero sum stochastic differ-
ential game corresponding to the desired game (P1)( refer 2.8a). In the third section we reformulate the
objective criterion under evaluation as a linear exponential of quadratic regulator problem (P2) (refer 3.11).
In the fourth section we provide a verification lemma that will help us solve this game problem. In the fifth
section we derive the optimal controls and obtain an explicit expression for the associated value of the game.
The article as usual concludes with remarks and pointers to future direction of work.
Broadly speaking our aim is to derive the saddle-point equilibrium pair for the game (P1). To achieve
this, we first obtain saddle point strategy for the game (P2). We then show that the saddle point equilibrium
for (P2) is also saddle point equilibrium for (P1).
2 Risk-sensitive zero sum stochastic differential game
We consider a market consisting of m + 1 ≥ 2 securities with n ≥ 1 factors. We assume that the set of
securities includes one bond whose price is governed by the ODE
dS0t = rtS
0
t dt, S
0
0 = s
0 (2.1)
where rt is a deterministic function of t. The other security prices and factors are assumed to satisfy the
following SDE’s
dSit = S
i
t{(a+AXt)
idt+
n+m∑
k=1
σikdW
k
t }, S
i
0 = s
i, i = 1, ...,m, (2.2)
where the factor process Xt satisfies,
dXt = {(b+BXt)dt+ ΛdWt}, X0 = x ∈ R
n (2.3)
HereWt = (Wt)k=1,...,n+m is an n+m dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on a filtered probability
space (Ω,F ,P,Ft).
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The factor process can represent macro-economic indicators such as GDP, inflation and market index
data. The stock price dynamics are modulated by the factor process. Hence one can incorporate the effect
of macro-economic indicators into the investment optimization problem by using the stock price process
modulated by the factor process Xt.
The model parameters A,B,Λ are respectivelym×n, n×n, n×(m+n) constant matrices and a ∈ Rm,
b ∈ Rn. The constant matrix (σik){i=1,2....,m;k=1,2,...,(n+m)} will be denoted by Σ in what follows.
In Kuroda and Nagai [11] it is assumed that the factor process and the stock price process do not
have independent noise i.e. ΣΛ
′
6= 0. This assumption is in sharp contrast to Bielecki and Pliska [2] who
conversely assume that ΣΛ
′
= 0. We will assume that ΣΛ
′
6= 0.
Let Gt = σ(Su, Xu, L
γ
u;u ≤ t) be the sigma-field generated by the underlying stock price process,
factor process and benchmark process Lγ to be defined later up to time t. The investment strategy which
represents the proportional allocation of total wealth in the ith security Sit is denoted by h
i
t for i = 1, ...,m.
Strategy (h0t , ht)0≤t≤T is said to be an investment strategy up to time T . We set S
′
t := (S
1
t , S
2
t , ..., S
m
t )
′
, h
′
t :=
(h1t , ..., h
m
t )
′
. The space of controls H(T ) consists of Rm-valued controls for the investor as follows: H(T ) is
the set of {B[0, T ]⊗ Gt}{t≥0}-progressively measurable stochastic processes such that
∑m
i=1 h
i
t + h
0
t = 1 and
where P (
∫ T
0 |hs|
2ds <∞) = 1 ∀ T <∞ and E[e
∫
T
0
θ2h
′
sΣΣ
′
hsds]
1
2
<∞.
For given h ∈ H(T ), the process Vt = V
h
t represents the investor’s wealth at time t, under the control
h, and satisfies the following SDE dynamics,
dV ht
V ht
= (rt + h
′
t((a+AXt)− rt1))dt+ h
′
tΣdWt;V
h
0 = v
which can be rewritten as,
dV ht
V ht
= (rt + h
′
tdt)dt+ h
′
tΣdWt;V
h
0 = v (2.4)
where dt , a + AXt − rt1. From equation (2.4) it can be seen that if a + AXt = rt1 i.e. dt = 0, then the
portfolio wealth process evolves with drift equal to the riskless interest rate rt. We make an assumption
here that the securities price volatility matrix Σ is a full rank matrix. If it is not full-rank then h
′
Σ = 0 for
some h 6= 0. Hence the market contains redundant asset(s) and the portfolio value process V ht will grow at
a rate different than the risk-less interest rate rt when h
′
d 6= 0 resulting in an arbitrage. This is the case if
the portfolio contains two or more redundant assets for example a stock and an option on the same stock.
Hence we remove redundancy till the resultant matrix Σ is of full rank thereby ensuring that there exist no
further possibility of arbitrage by trading in the resultant portfolio. In our benchmark model we express the
objective through a new optimization criterion corresponding to a reward function F which represents the
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log excess return of the asset portfolio over its benchmark and is given as
F (t;h, γ) = log
V ht
Lγt
F (0;h, γ) = log f
We now formally state the Risk-sensitive Benchmarked Asset management problem (RSBAM) that we solve.
Problem : Risk-sensitive Benchmarked Asset Management (RSBAM)
We first define the objective criterion J as,
J(f, x, h, γ;T ) ,
−2
θ
logE[exp [
−θ
2
F (T, h, γ)]]
=
−2
θ
logE[
(
V hT
LγT
)−θ/2
]
=
−2
θ
logE[U(
V hT
LγT
)] (2.5)
where the utility function U(·) is U : x→ x−
θ
2 . The dynamics of the benchmark process is a diffusion process
Lγ modulated by a (Markovian) control γ given by
dLγt
Lγt
= (αt + βtXt)dt+ γ
′
tdWt (2.6)
where αt ∈ R and β ∈ R
1×n. The space of controls Γ(T ) consists of the market control represented by γ that
is Rn+m-valued. Γ(T ) consists of progressively measurable controls measurable w.r.t to {B[0, T ]⊗ Gt}t≥0
and where P (
∫ T
0
|γs|
2ds <∞) = 1 ∀ T <∞ and E[eθ
2
∫
T
0
γ
′
sγsds]
1
2
<∞ .
By a simple application of Ito’s formula we have:
dF (t, h, γ) = d log(
V ht
Lγt
) = F (t, h, γ){[rt + ht
′(a+AXt − rt1)− (αt + βtXt)−
1
2
h
′
tΣΣ
′
ht +
1
2
γ
′
tγt]dt
+ (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)dWt} (2.7)
We are now in a position to formally state the game-theoretic version of the game. For a given θ > 0,
we consider a stochastic differential game between two players, namely, the investor (who has a power utility)
U and who modulates the payoff for given γ ∈ Γ(T ) via control h ∈ H(T ). On the other hand the second
player, say the market, behaves antagonistically to the investor by setting a benchmark for the investor to
outperform by modulating the control γ for a given control h. This can be conceptualized as a risk-sensitive
zero sum stochastic differential game between the investor on one side and the market on the other and is
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formalized as follows
Problem (P1) Obtain hˆ ∈ H(T ) and γˆ ∈ Γ(T ) such that,
J(f, x, hˆ, γˆ;T ) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
−2
θ
logE[(
V hT
LγT
)−
θ
2 ] = inf
γ∈Γ(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
−2
θ
logE[(
V hT
LγT
)−
θ
2 ] (2.8a)
This can be construed as a game-theoretic version of the RSBAM problem.
Remark 2.1:
The problem set up (P1) is an extension of Kuroda and Nagai [11] and Davis and Lleo [6]. However the
former does not consider the benchmarked version i.e. the benchmark index is identically one in [11] while
in Davis and Lleo [6] though have a benchmarked portfolio criterion, they solve the one player optimization
problem and not the two player saddle point problem.
In light of the mathematical preliminaries just discussed, we formally elaborate the plan to solve the
zero sum stochastic differential game (P1).
Step 1 We reformulate the original objective criterion as a power utility function to an exponential of an
integral function.
Step 2 Define a new path functional I(f, x, h, γ, t;T ) (refer equation (3.9)) related to the exponential of the
integral function. Define u¯(t, x) to be the upper-value function while u(t, x) be the lower-value function for
the game associated with I. Denote the game related to this objective functional as (P2).
Step 3 Deduce the HJBI PDE corresponding to game (P2)( refer (3.11).
Step 4 Formulate the conditions that a candidate value function should satisfy for the game with regards to
objective function I to have a value. This constitutes the verification lemma.
Step 5 Solve the HJBI PDE derived in step 3 while obtaining the expression for optimal controls. This
optimal control pair will constitute a saddle point equilibrium for (P2). The candidate value function
satisfying all the conditions of the verification lemma is our desired value function for (P2).
Step 6 Reverting back to the original problem (P1), show using facts derived in Step 4, that the game with
objective criterion J now has a value as well, and is in fact u(0, x).
In the next section we reformulate the objective criterion and formalize our game problem.
3 Problem Reformulation
Step 1
We will first transform the utility optimization problem (2.5) into optimizing the exponential-of-integral
performance criterion.
Criterion under the expectation
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Our first aim is to write the objective criterion J only in terms of the factor process. Towards that end we
define the function g(x, h, γ, r; θ) as follows:
g(x, h, γ, r; θ) =
1
2
(
θ
2
+ 1)h
′
ΣΣ
′
h− r − h
′
(a+Ax− r1) + (α+ βx) −
1
2
θ
2
(h
′
Σγ + γ
′
Σ
′
h)
+
1
2
(
θ
2
− 1)γ
′
γ (3.1)
From (2.7) and (3.1) we therefore have,
d exp(
−θ
2
F (t;h, γ)) =
θ
2
(
g(Xt, ht, γt, rt; θ)− (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)ΣdWt
)
−
θ2
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(h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)ΣΣ
′
(Σ
′
ht − γt)dt
(3.2)
Thus we have,
exp(
−θ
2
F (t;h, γ)) = f−θ/2 exp{
θ
2
∫ t
0
g(Xs, hs, γs, r; θ)ds
−
θ
2
∫ t
0
(h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)dWs −
1
2
(
θ
2
)
2 ∫ t
0
(h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)(h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)
′
ds} (3.3)
where V h0 = v, L
γ
0 = l and f =
V h0
Lγ0
= vl .
Change of measure
Let Ph,γ be the measure on (Ω,F) defined by,
dPh,γ
dP
|Ft = X¯t, (3.4)
where X¯t is given by
X¯t = E(
θ
2
∫
0
(h
′
Σ− γ
′
)dW )t (3.5)
and where E(·) denotes the Doleans-Dade or martingale exponential. From the assumption made on the
space of admissible controls H(T ) and Γ(T ) it is clear that the Kazamaki condition E[e
∫
t
0
θ
h
′
sΣ−γ
′
s
2 dWs ] <∞
∀t ∈ [0, T ] is satisfied so that Ph,γ to be a probability measure. i.e.
E[E(
θ
2
∫
0
(h
′
Σ− γ
′
)dW )T ] = 1. (3.6)
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We note that,
Wh,γt ,Wt +
θ
2
∫ t
0
(h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)ds, (3.7)
by Girsanov’s formula, is a standard Brownian motion under Ph,γ and the factor process Xt satisfies,
dXt = (b +BXt −
θ
2
(Σ
′
ht − γt))
′
dt+ ΛdWh,γt (3.8)
Step 2
The HJB equation
Taking expectation w.r.t to the physical measure P and multiplying both sides of equation (3.3) by −2θ
followed by the change of measure argument of (3.4-3.5) one considers the new path functional I defined as
I(f, x, h, γ, t, T ) = log f −
2
θ
logEh,γ [exp {
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, hs, γs, rs+t; θ)ds}] (3.9)
and then the upper-value function and lower-value function u¯ and u respectively for the game corresponding
to the new path functional I are given by :
u¯(t, x) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
I(f, x, h, γ, t, T ) (3.10a)
u(t, x) = inf
γ∈Γ(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
I(f, x, h, γ, t, T ) (3.10b)
u(t, x) = u¯(t, x) = u(t, x) (3.10c)
If a pair of controls satisfy (3.10c), then the game corresponding to the new path functional I has the
value u and the pair of controls constitutes saddle point strategies for the game with regards to I. Let the
exponentially transformed function I˜ be defined as I˜ = exp(− θ2I) and u˜(t, x) := exp(−
θ
2u(t, x)). We now
consider the problem of determining the saddle-point equilibrium for the game corresponding to the new
path functional I˜. We call this problem (P2) and it is formally stated as follows:
Problem P2 Obtain hˆ ∈ H(T ) and γˆ ∈ Γ(T ) such that,
u˜(t, x) = inf
h∈H(T )
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
I˜(f, x, h, γ, t, T )
= sup
γ∈Γ(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
I˜(f, x, h, γ, t, T )
= Ehˆ,γˆ [exp{
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, hˆs, γˆs, rs+t; θ)ds}f
−θ/2] (3.11)
We now provide a verification lemma for this game. Let us first define the process Y h,γ(t) by
dY h,γ(t) =
(
dt
dXt
)
=
(
dt
(b +BXt −
θ
2 (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t))dt + ΛdW
h,γ
t
)
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Let y ,(t, x). The control process h(t) = h(t, ω) and γ(t) = γ(t, ω) for ω ∈ Ω can be assumed to be
Markovian. Let O = (0, T )×Rn. Then the process Y h,γ(t) is a Markov process whose generator A˜h,γ acting
on a function u˜(t, x) ∈ C20 ([0, T ]× R
n) is given by,
A˜h,γ u˜(t, x) =
∂u˜(t, x)
∂t
+ (b+Bx−
θ
2
Λ(Σ
′
h− γ))
′
Du˜(t, x) +
1
2
tr(ΛΛ∗D2u˜(t, x)) (3.12)
in which Du˜(t, x) , (∂u˜(t,x)∂x1 , ...,
∂u˜(t,x)
∂xn )
′
and D2u˜(t, x) is the matrix defined by D2u˜(t, x) , [∂
2u˜(t,x)
∂xixj ], i, j =
1, 2, ..., n.
Step 3
By an application of the Feynman-Kac formula, it can be deduced from (3.11) that the HJBI PDE
for u˜(t, x) is given by
(
A˜hˆ,γˆ +
θ
2
g(x, hˆ, γˆ, r; θ)
)
u˜(t, x) = 0 (3.13)
Reversing the exponential transformation , dividing by −(θ/2)u˜(t, x), we can deduce from (3.13) that the
HJBI PDE for u(t, x) is given for h ∈ Rm and γ ∈ R(m+n) by
Ahˆ,γˆu(t, x) = 0 (3.14)
where the operator Ah,γ is given by,
Ah,γu(t, x) =
∂u(t, x)
∂t
+ (b+Bx−
θ
2
Λ(Σ
′
h− γ))
′
Du(t, x) +
1
2
tr(ΛΛ
′
D2u(t, x))
−
θ
4
(Du(t, x))
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t, x)− g(x, h, γ, r; θ) (3.15)
In the next section we provide a verification lemma for the game based on the criterion function I.
4 Verification lemma for the game PII
Step 4
We now provide a verification lemma related to the game (PII).
Proposition 4.1. Suppose w˜ ∈ C1,2(O) ∩ C(O¯) (is the space of twice differentiable functions on O with
respect to x, once continuously differentiable on O with respect to t and which are continuous on O¯ ). Suppose
there exists a (Markov) control hˆ(y), γˆ(y) such that
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1. (A˜h,γˆ(y) + θ2g(x, h, γˆ(y), r; θ))[(w˜(y))] ≥ 0 ∀ h ∈ R
m;
2. (A˜hˆ(y),γ + θ2g(x, hˆ(y), γ, r; θ))[(w˜(y))] ≤ 0 ∀ γ ∈ R
m+n;
3. (A˜hˆ(y),γˆ(y) + θ2g(x, hˆ(y), γˆ(y), r; θ))[(w˜(y))] = 0 ∀ y ∈ O;
4. (w˜(T,XT )) = f
−θ/2.
Define,
Z˜(s) = Z˜(s)(h, γ) =
θ
2
{∫ s
0
g(Xτ , hτ , γτ , rt+τ ; θ)dτ
}
(4.1)
5. Eh,γ [
∫ T−t
0
Dw˜
′
(t+ s,Xs)Λe
Z˜sdWh,γs ] = 0 ∀ h ∈ R
m, ∀ γ ∈ Rm+n
Now, define for each y ∈ O and h ∈ H(T ) and γ ∈ Γ(T ),
I˜(f, x, h, γ, t, T ) = exp(−
θ
2
I(f, x, h, γ, t, T ))
= Eh,γ [exp{
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, hs, γs, rs+t; θ)ds}f
−θ/2],
Then (hˆ(y), γˆ(y)) is an optimal (Markov) control i.e.,
w˜(0, x) = u˜(0, x) = I˜(f, x, hˆ, γ, 0, T ) = inf
h∈H(T )
{ sup
γ∈Γ(T )
[I˜(f, x, h, γ, 0, T )]}
= sup
γ∈Γ(T )
{ inf
h∈H(T )
[I˜(f, x, h, γ, 0, T )]}
= sup
γ∈Γ(T )
I˜(f, x, hˆ, γ, 0, T)
= inf
h∈H(T )
I˜(f, x, h, γˆ, 0, T ) = I˜(f, x, hˆ, γˆ, 0, T )
Proof Apply Ito’s formula to w˜(s,Xs)e
Z˜s to obtain
d(w˜(t+ s,Xs)e
Z˜s) =
[
eZ˜s(A˜h,γ +
θ
2
g(Xs, hs, γs, rs+t; θ))
]
[(w˜(t+ s,Xs))]ds+ e
Z˜s(Dw˜(t+ s,Xs))dW
h,γ
s
w˜(T,XT−t)e
Z˜T−t = w˜(t, x) +
∫ T−t
0
((A˜h,γ +
θ
2
g(Xs, hs, γs, rs+t; θ))w˜(t+ s,Xs))e
Z˜sds
+
∫ T−t
0
(Dw˜
′
(t+ s,Xs)Λ)e
Z˜sdWh,γs (4.2)
From condition(4) of statement of the Proposition, we have w˜(T,XT ) = f
−θ/2. Taking expectation with
respect to Ph,γ , setting t = 0 and using conditions (1) and (5) of the Proposition we get
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Eh,Γ[w˜(T,XT )e
Z˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x)
Since this inequality is true for all h ∈ H(T ) we have
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,Γ[f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x)
Hence we have,
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,Γ[f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≥ w˜(0, x) (4.3)
Similarly, setting t = 0 we get, using condition (2) of the Proposition, we get the following lower bound,
Ehˆ,γ [w˜(T,XT )e
Z˜T ] ≤ w˜(0, x)
Since this inequality is true for all γ ∈ Γ(T ) we have
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Ehˆ,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ w˜(0, x)
Hence we have,
inf
h∈H(T )
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Ehˆ,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ w˜(0, x) (4.4)
Also , setting t = 0 and using condition (3) of the Proposition and using the definition of u˜ in (3.11) we get,
Ehˆ,γˆ [w˜(T,XT )e
Z˜T ] = w˜(0, x)
= Ehˆ,γˆ [exp{
θ
2
∫ T
0
g(Xs, hˆs, γˆs, rs+t; θ)ds}f
−θ/2] (4.5)
It is automaticaly true that
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ inf
h∈H(T )
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ]. (4.6)
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Conversely, from (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) we have,
inf
h∈H(T )
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] ≤ w˜(0, x) ≤ sup
γ∈Γ(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] (4.7)
Hence from (4.6) and (4.7) we have,
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] = inf
h∈H(T )
sup
γ∈Γ(T )
Eh,γ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ]
= w˜(0, x) = Ehˆ,γˆ [f−θ/2eZ˜T ] (4.8)
Corollary 4.2 Admissible(optimal) strategies for the exponentially transformed problem given by (3.11)
are also admissible(optimal) for the problem (3.10c). Formally,
u(0, x) = sup
h∈H(T )
{ inf
γ∈Γ(T )
[I(f, x, h, γ, 0, T )]}
= inf
γ∈Γ(T )
{ sup
h∈H(T )
[I(f, x, h, γ, 0, T )]}
= inf
γ∈Γ(T )
I(f, x, hˆ, γ, 0, T)
= sup
h∈H(T )
I(f, x, h, γˆ, 0, T ) = I(f, x, hˆ, γˆ, 0, T )
Proof The value function u and u˜ are related through the strictly monotone continuous transformation
u˜(t, x) = exp(− θ2u(t, x)). Thus admissible (optimal) strategies for the exponentially transformed problem
are also admissible(optimal) for the problem (3.10c).
5 Solving the risk-sensitive zero sum stochastic differential game
Step 5
We seek to find the value function u for the game defined in (3.12). We guess a solution assuming that
it belongs to the class C1,2((0, T )×Rn) and show that the guess satisfies all the conditions of our verification
lemma given by Proposition 4.1. Conditions (1)-(4) of the verification lemma can be written in a compact
form as
sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
Ah,γu(t, x) = 0; u(T, x) = log f (5.1)
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Motivated by the results in Kuroda and Nagai [11], we will look for a u given by u(t, x) = 12x
′
Qtx+ q
′
tx+ kt
where Q is an n× n symmetric matrix, q ∈ Rn and k is a scalar. Substituting this form in (3.15) we get
Ah,γu(t, x) =
1
2
x
′ dQt
dt
x+
dqt
dt
′
x+
dkt
dt
+
(
b+Bx−
θ
2
Λ(Σ
′
ht − γ(t))
)′
(Qtx+ qt)
+
1
2
(ΛΛ
′
QtQ
′
tΛ
′
Λ)−
θ
4
(Qtx+ kt)
′
ΛΛ
′
(Qtx+ kt)
−
1
2
(
θ
2
+ 1)h
′
tΣΣ
′
ht + rt − (αt + βx) + h
′
t(a+Ax− rt1) +
1
2
θ
2
(h
′
tΣγ + γ
′
Σ
′
ht)
−
1
2
(
θ
2
− 1)γ
′
tγt (5.2)
Remark 5.1 Since the game considered is for the risk-averse investor θ > 0. Moreover based in the
expression for γˆ in (5.5), θ 6= 2. This leaves for two possibilities: θ ∈ (0, 2) or θ ∈ (2,∞). For the optimal
strategies (hˆ, γˆ) to be a saddle-point equilibrium for the game, we would desire that the equation with the
quadratic term in h be negative definite while the quadratic term in γ be positive definite. In fact for the
choice θ > 0, the quadratic term in h desirably is negative definite while for θ < 2, the quadratic term in γ
is positive definite . Hence for our case the valid range of θ is between 0 and 2 and excludes the other two
possibilities for the range of θ.
We now solve the first order condition for γˆ to minimize Ahˆ,γu(t, x) over all γ ∈ Rn+m:
(2− θ)γˆt − θ(Σ
′
hˆt − γˆ
′
)Du(t, x) = 0 (5.3)
The first order condition for hˆ that maximizes Ah,γˆ(y)u˜(t, x) over all h ∈ Rm in terms of u(t, x) is,
hˆt =
2
(θ + 2)
(ΣΣ
′
)−1[dt +
θ
2
Σγˆt −
θ
2
ΣΛ
′
Du(t, x)] (5.4)
Substituting back hˆ obtained in (5.4) into (5.3) we get
γˆt =
θ
2− θ
[Σ
′
hˆt − Λ
′
Du(t, x)] (5.5)
The optimal control hˆt is a global maximum while γˆt is a global minimum for t ≤ [0, T ]. We substitute hˆ
from (5.4) and γˆ from (5.5) in (5.1) to obtain
Ahˆ,γˆu(t, x) = 0; u(T, x) = log f (5.6)
We then group all the resulting quadratic terms in x, linear terms in x and constants together to conclude
that the choice of u(t, x) = 12x
′
Qtx + q
′
tx + kt is indeed the solution to the HJBI PDE (5.1) provided that
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Q, q and k satisfy the following system of differential equations:
• a matrix Ricatti equation related to the coefficient of the quadratic term and used to determine the
symmetric non-negative matrix Qt, given as
dQt
dt
= QtK0Qt +K
′
1Qt +QtK1 + 2
2− θ
(2− θ2)
2A
′
(ΣΣ−1)
−1
A = 0 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
QT = 0 (5.7)
where
K0 =
−θ2
2(2−θ)ΛΛ
′
+ 2θ
2
(2−θ)(2−θ2)2
ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
ΣΛ
′
K1 = B −
2θ
(2−θ2)2
A
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
ΣΛ
′
• The following linear ordinary differential equation satisfied by the n element column vector q(t)
dqt
dt
+ (K
′
1 +QtK0)qt +Q
′
tb+ (a− r(t)1)
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
[
−2θ
(2 − θ2)
2ΣΛ
′
Q(t) +
(2− θ)
(2 − θ2)2
A]
− βt
qT = 0 (5.8)
• The following linear ordinary differential equation satisfied by the constant kt
dkt
dt
+
1
2
tr(ΛΛ
′
Qt) + rt − αt −
2θ
(2− θ2)2
(a− r(t)1)
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
ΣΛ
′
q(t)
+
2− θ
(2− θ2)2
(a− r(t)1)−1(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
(a− r(t)1) +
θ2
(2− θ)(2− θ2)2
q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)
−1
ΣΛ
′
q(t)
−
θ2
4(2− θ)
q
′
(t)ΛΛ
′
q(t)
kT = log f (5.9)
Condition 4 of Proposition 4.1 in terms of u imposes the terminal condition in (5.9).
If K0 is positive definite then a unique solution to the Riccati equation (5.7), Qt , exists for all t ≤ T .
This property of positive definiteness follows from interpretation of the solution Qt as the covariance matrix
of observations from a Kalman filter used to estimate the state of a dynamical system (see Theorem 4.4.1 in
Davis [5]) for details. The uniqueness property of Qt follows from the standard existence-uniqueness theorem
for first order differential equations (see Proposition 4.4.2 in Davis [5]).
It remains to be seen if u˜ = exp(− θ2u) for the choice of u satisfies condition (5) of Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 5.2 Eh,γ [
∫ T−t
0 e
Z˜s(Du˜
′
(t+ s,Xs)Λ)dW
h,γ
s ] = 0.
Proof From the definition of u˜ in (3.11), for any optimal control belonging to Γ(T ), the strategy hˆ ≡ 0
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is sub-optimal, and hence will provide an upper bound on u˜. Further for the zero-benchmark case namely,
γˆ ≡ 0, we would obtain now an upper bound on u˜
u˜(t, x) = inf
h∈H(T )
Eh,γˆ [exp{
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, hs, γˆs, rs+t; θ)ds}f
−θ/2]
≤ E0,γˆ [exp{
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, 0, γˆs, rs+t; θ)ds}f
−θ/2]
∴ u˜(t, x) ≤ E0,0[exp{
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
g(Xs, 0, 0, rs+t; θ)ds}f
−θ/2]
= exp(−
θ
2
∫ T−t
0
rs+tds)f
−θ/2
Now Q and q are solutions to the system of o.d.e, and hence are integrals of bounded functions . Hence
Q and q are continuous functions of time t ∈ [0, T ] and hence bounded on [0, T ]. The matrix Λ is a
known constant. From standard existence-uniqueness result of stochastic differential equation (refer Oksendal
([14])) we have X ∈ L2(Ω,F ,Ph,γ). Hence from the upper bound on u˜ , Remark 3.1 and the fact that
Du(t,Xt) = QtXt + qt is in L
2(Ω,F ,Ph,γ), we have that Eh,γ([Du˜ ΛeZ˜, Du˜ ΛeZ˜ ]t) <∞ ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence
we have Eh,γ [
∫ T−t
0 Du˜
′
(t+ s,Xs)Λe
Z˜sdWh,γs ] = 0. .
It is clear that our guess for u˜ = exp(− θ2u) satisfies conditions (1)-(5) of Proposition 4.1. Hence our choice
of u˜ indeed is the value of the game (P2) and controls hˆ, γˆ are the saddle point equilibrium of this game.
Lemma 5.2 For the choice of space of controls H(T ) and Γ(T ), we have
E[E
(
−
θ
2
∫
0
[(QtXt + qt)Λ + (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)]dWt
)
T
] = 1 (5.10)
Proof: From the Kazamaki condition, refer (Oksendal [14]), (5.10) holds if
E[exp(
∫ t
0
θ(
(QsXs+qs)Λ+(h
′
sΣ−γ
′
s)
2 )dWs)] <∞ ∀ t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence by application of Cauchy-Schwartz inequal-
ity we have,
E[exp(
∫ t
0
θ(
(QsXs + qs)Λ + (h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)
2
)dWs)] ≤ (E[e
∫
t
0
θ(QsXs+qs)ΛdWs ])1/2(E[e
∫
t
0
θ(h
′
sΣ−γ
′
s)dWs ])
1/2
However for E[e
∫
t
0
θ(QsXs+qs)ΛdWs ] < ∞ to hold , it is enough to show that the Novikov condition given by
E[e
∫
T
0
θ2(QsXs+qs)ΛΛ
′
(QsXs+qs)ds] <∞ hold; refer (Oksendal [14]). Since X is Gaussian process and Qt and
qt are deterministic, (QtXt + qt)Λ is Gaussian and hence by completion of squares argument detailed in
Theorem 5.3 below we have E[e
∫
T
0
θ2(QsXs+qs)ΛΛ
′
(QsXs+qs)ds] <∞ holds and hence E[e
∫
t
0
θ(QsXs+qs)ΛdWs ] <
∞ ∀t ∈ [0, T ] is validated. (E[e
∫
t
0
θ(h
′
sΣ−γ
′
s)dWs ])
1/2
< ∞ is validated from similar application of Cauchy-
Schwartz inequality followed by the assumption made earlier in the definition of the space of controls H(T )
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and Γ(T ). Thus the Kazamaki condition holds and the conclusion follows.
Theorem 5.3 If there exist a solution Q to (5.7), then the strategies (hˆ, γˆ) defined by
hˆt =
2
(θ + 2)
(ΣΣ
′
)−1[dt +
θ
2
Σγt −
θ
2
ΣΛ
′
(QtXt + qt)] (5.11)
γˆt =
θ
2− θ
[Σ
′
hˆt − Λ
′
(QtXt + qt)] (5.12)
where q is a solution of (5.8) are admissible i.e. h ∈ H(T ) and γ ∈ Γ(T ) and are optimal for the finite
horizon game problem (P1), namely,
u(0, x) = sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ; θ)
= inf
γ∈Γ(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ; θ)
= inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, hˆ, γ, T ; θ)
= sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γˆ, T ; θ)
= J(f, x, hˆ, γˆ, T ; θ)
=
1
2
x
′
Q0x+ q
′
0x+ k0
Proof The controls derived in section 5, (hˆ, γˆ) forms the saddle point equilibrium for the (P2) game . We
aim to show that these controls are in fact admissible and optimal for the problem (P1) as well.
Proof of admissibility From the expression for hˆ and γˆ in (5.11) and (5.12) respectively we note that
− θ2
(
(QtXt + qt)Λ + (hˆ
′
tΣ − γˆ
′
t)
)
can be written linearly in Xt as X
′
tv
1
t + v
2
t where, constants v
1
t and
v2t are given by,
v1t = −
θ
2
Q
′
(t)Λ +
θ(θ − 1)
(2− θ2)
A
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
+
θ(θ − 1)
2− θ2
Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1(a− r1)
−
2θ2(θ − 1)
(2− θ)(2 − θ2)
Q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
q(t)−
θ2
(2− θ)
Q
′
(t)ΛΛ
′
q(t).
v2t = −
θ
2
q
′
(t)Λ +
θ(θ − 1)
(2− θ2)
(a− r1)
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
q(t)
−
θ2(θ − 1)
(2− θ)(2 − θ2)
q
′
(t)ΛΣ
′
(ΣΣ
′
)−1ΣΛ
′
q(t)−
θ2
(2 − θ)
q
′
(t)ΛΛ
′
q(t)
Since X satisfies the SDE , dXt = (b + BXt)dt + ΛdWt, so E|Xt| ≤ E|X(0)| + |b|T + |B|
∫ t
0 E|Xs|ds.
By Gronwall’s inequality, therefore E|Xt| ≤ (E|X(0)| + |b|T ) exp(|B|t) and Cov(Xt) = Λ
′
Λt. Let φ(t) ,
v1tXt+v
2
t . We now explicitly calculate E[e
δ|φt|
2
] for some δ > 0 since from Remark 2 in Lemma 2, of section 12
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(Gihman and Skorokhod [9]) would imply that the Novikov’s condition holds true. Let Rt = e
−BtXt+ e
−bt.
Hence dRt = e
−BtΛdWt. Therefore Rt is a Gaussian process and hence φt is Gaussian process with drift.
Also µt = E[|φt|] ≤ sup0≤t≤T |v
1
t |(E|X0| + |b|T ) exp(|B|t) + sup0≤t≤T |v
2
t | and Σ˜t = Cov(φt) ≤ v
1
′
tΛ
′
Λv1t .
Thus mean µt and co-variance Σ˜t are bounded above by t. We use the following completion of squares
argument: 12z
′
Az + b
′
z + c = 12 (z +A
−1b)
′
A(z +A−1b) + c− 12b
′
A−1b .
E[eδ|φt|
2
] =
∫
Rn
1
2pin/2|Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t|
1/2
eδ|φ|
2
t e−
1
2 (φ−µt)
′
(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1(φ−µt)dx
1dx2...dxn
=
1
2pin/2|Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t|
1/2
∫
Rn
e
−φ
′
(−2δI+(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1)
−1
φ+2µ
′
(t)(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1φ−µ
′
t(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1µt
2 dx1....dxn
=
|(Σ˜
′
tΣ˜t)|
−1/2
|(−2δI + (Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1)−1|
−1/2
×
e
−µ
′
t(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1µt+4µ
′
t(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1(−2δI+(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1)
−1
(Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1µt
2
Matrix (Σ˜tΣ˜t)
−1
is symmetric positive definite with lowest eigenvalue say λmin. Then it is easy to show that
for δ < λmin2 , matrix (−2δI + (Σ˜tΣ˜
′
t)
−1)−1 is positive definite . Along with the derived fact that µt and Σ˜t
is bounded above by t ≤ T , hence there exists some constant C such that E[eδ|φt|
2
] ≤ C. Hence the optimal
controls hˆ, γˆ belong to their respective admissible class viz. H(T ) and Γ(T ) respectively.
Proof of optimality Define,
Zs = Zs(h, γ) =
θ
2
{∫ s
0
g(Xτ , hτ , γτ , rt+τ ; θ)dτ − (h
′
τΣ− γ
′
τ )dWτ
−
θ
4
(h
′
τΣ− γ
′
τ )
′
(h
′
τΣ− γ
′
τ )dτ
}
(5.13)
Also define, χ(t, x) = − θ2 (u(t, x)− log f) and Lu(t, x) =
1
2 tr(ΛΛ
′
D2u(t, x)) + (b+Bx)
′
Du(t, x)
Hence, we have
dχ(t+ s,Xs) = −
θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
+ Lu)(t+ s,Xs)ds−
θ
2
Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
ΛdWs
Hence,
d exp{χ(t+ s,Xs)}
exp{χ(t+ s,Xs)}
= −
θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
(t, x) + Lu)(t+ s,Xs)−
θ
2
Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
ΛdWs
+
θ2
8
Du
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t+ s,Xs)ds
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and so,
d exp{χ(t+ s,Xs)} exp{Z(s)}
exp{χ(t+ s,Xs)} exp{Z(s)}
= −
θ
2
(
∂u
∂t
(t, x) + Lu)(t+ s,Xs)−
θ
2
Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
ΛdWs
+
θ2
8
Du
′
ΛΛ
′
Du(t+ s,Xs)ds+
θ
2
g(Xs, hs, γs, rs + t; θ)ds
−
θ
2
(h
′
(s)Σ− γ
′
(s))dWs +
θ2
4
(h
′
(s)Σ− γ
′
(s))Λ
′
Du(t+ s,Xs)ds
Hence from (3.15), we have,
exp{χ(T,X(T − t)) + Z(T − t)} = exp(χ(t, x)) exp
[ ∫ T−t
0
−
θ
2
(Ah,γu(t+ s,Xs))ds
−
∫ T−t
0
θ
2
[Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
Λ + (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)]dWt
−
∫ T−t
0
θ2
8
[Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
+ (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)][Du(t+ s,Xs)
′
+ (h
′
tΣ− γ
′
t)]
′
ds
]
(5.14)
We have shown that u satisfies conditions (1)-(5) of Proposition 4.1 Hence from condition(4) of Proposition
4.1, we have χ(T, x) = 0. Now setting t = 0 and taking condition (1) of Proposition 4.1 into account for
γ = γˆ, and for any h ∈ Hˆ(T ) we see from (5.14) that
(
V hT
LγT
)
−θ/2
≥ e−
θ
2u(0,x) exp
[
−
∫ T
0
θ
2
[Du(s,Xs)
′
Λ + (h
′
sΣ− Γ
′
s)]dWs
−
∫ T
0
θ2
8
[Du(s,Xs)
′
+ (h
′
sΣ− γ
′
s)][Du(s,Xs)
′
+ (h
′
sΣ− Γ
′
s)]
′
ds
]
Now by taking expectations w.r.t to the physical probability measure P on both sides of above equation and
using Lemma 5.2, we obtain
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≤ u(0, x)
This inequality is true for all h ∈ H(T ) so we have,
sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≤ u(0, x)
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Hence we have,
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≤ sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≤ u(0, x) (5.15)
Likewise, setting t = 0 and taking condition (2) of Proposition 4.1 into account for h = hˆ, and for any
γ ∈ Γ(T ) we see that
J(f, x, hˆ, γ, T ) ≥ u(0, x)
This inequality is true for all h ∈ H(T ) so:
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, hˆ, γ, T ) ≥ u(0, x)
Hence we have,
sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≥ inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, hˆ, γ, T ) ≥ u(0, x) (5.16)
Hence from (5.15) and (5.16) we have,
sup
h∈H(T )
inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) ≥ u(0, x) ≥ inf
γ∈Γ(T )
sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T ) (5.17)
Moreover, setting t = 0 and taking condition (3) of Proposition 4.1 into account for h = hˆ, γ = γˆ (such that
hˆ ∈ H(T ) and γˆ ∈ Γ(T )) we see that
J(f, x, hˆ, γˆ, T ) = u(0, x) (5.18)
It is always true that
sup
h∈H(T )
( inf
γ∈Γ(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T )) ≤ inf
γ∈Γ(T )
( sup
h∈H(T )
J(f, x, h, γ, T )) (5.19)
Hence combining (5.17) and (5.19) we deduce the final conclusion that the game (P1) has a value and is
u(0, x).
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6 Conclusion
In this article we provide a two player zero sum stochastic differential game in the context of the risk-sensitive
benchmark asset management problem. We obtain an explicit expression for the optimal strategies for both
the players. Future work could be directed towards considering a game theoretic benchmark problem with
infinite horizon risk sensitive criterion.
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